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COMMENT
POST TRIAL MOTIONS UNDER THE NEW INDIANA RULES-
EDWIN H. GREENEBAUMt
The new Indiana Rules of Procedure governing post-trial motions
adopt the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in some respects; in others
they carry forward current Indiana Law. Yet other provisions of Trial
Rules 50, 52, 59 and 60,' however, are novel in form and substance.
There are three central questions or issues which are confronted in
the post-trial motion area. The first is: When and under what circum-
stances may a trial judge decide a case upon his own view of the merits?
That issue, of course, must be approached in a very different manner in
jury and non-jury trials. The second issue is: When and under what
circumstances may a trial judge decide that the disposition of a case on
the merits will not be final because of defects or unfairness in the pro-
ceedings? The third and last question is: Under what circumstances may a
trial court relieve a party from the effects of a judgment which has become
final ?
In federal practice each of these issues is dealt with in separate
rules.2 Federal Rules 50 and 52 deal with the decision of cases in jury
and non-jury trials respectively; Federal Rule 59 governs the granting of
new trials; and Federal Rule 60 (b) governs the reopening of judgments
after they have become final.
In contrast to the federal practice, the new Indiana Rules deal
with these matters in highly interrelated and overlapping provisions.
With a few exceptions to be noted, this distinct drafting was not intended
to alter the substantive standards applicable to these issues. But form has
a way of controlling substance, even in this modern age, and the new
rules will pose some challenging questions of construction and adminis-
tration.
t Adapted from an Address to Annual Conference, Indiana University School
of Law Alumni Association, November 7, 1969.
t Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University.
1. INDIANA RULES OF PRocEuP.E, TRIAL. RuLMs (effective date, January 1, 1970)
[hereinafter Trial Rules].
2. There are two minor exceptions: FED. R. Civ. P. 59(e) places a time limit on
motions to amend judgments in the rule principally governing motions for new trial and
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a), governs the definitive correction of clerical errors. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure will bereafter be referred to as "Federal Rules."
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TRIAL RULE 50
Trial Rule 50 is entitled "Judgment on the Evidence (Directed
Verdict)." Under this rule trial judges may displace juries even though a
constitutional right to jury trial has been properly claimed. The new rule
is intended to carry forward the traditionally restrictive standards re-
garding when trial judges may take such strong action. The language of
the rule, the legislative history behind it' and the use of the phrase
"directed verdict" in parentheses in the title of the rule, apparently in
apposition to the phrase "Judgment on the Evidence," so indicate. The
Reporter's Comments to the Civil Code Study Commission Draft speak
of motions under this rule as "subject to substantive law principles." 4
There will, however, be sources of confusion on this matter. The title
"Judgment on the Evidence" is much less effective in warning the court
that a jury is being displaced than is the language in the Federal Rules:
"Directed Verdict" and "Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict." Also,
the new rule explicitly joins constitutional juries and advisory juries,
subjecting both to the same standard of review in motions for judgment
on the evidence.' Traditionally and constitutionally the rules governing
when a trial judge may ignore an advisory jury are distinct matters, the
trial judge having considerable latitude in this regard. Another source of
confusion occurs because the question of displacing the jury is dealt with
redundantly in Trial Rule 59, the Motion to Correct Errors. The ground
that "the verdict or decision is not supported by sufficient evidence.... or
is contrary to the evidence" is included in a list of nine grounds for the
correction of errors.' The various remedies for defects in the proceedings
are then listed in a separate subdivision ;7 there it is learned that granting
a new trial because a verdict is contrary to the evidence is a burdensome
3. The Proposed Draft of this rule as advanced by the Civil Code Study Com-
mission stated that trial judges could displace juries in cases where critical "issues
* * • are not supported by any reasonable evidence or a verdict thereon is clearly
erroneous as contrary to the evidence." Indiana Civil Code Study Commission,
Indiana Rules of Civil Procedure (Proposed Final Draft, 1968) [hereafter Proposed
Draft] Rule 50(A). The Supreme Court's Committee on Rules amended this to the
rule's current articulation, speaking of issues not supported by "sufficient evidence"
and has added to the concept of verdicts which are "clearly erroneous as contrary to
the evidence" the language, "because the evidence is insufficient to support" them. This
language conforms more closely to that previously used in Indiana cases on directed
verdicts.
4. Proposed Draft at 186. Loosening of restrictions on directed verdicts may raise
constitutional issues. See, Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
5. "Where all or some of the issues in a case tried before a jury or advisory jury
are not supported by sufficient evidence . . . the court shall withdraw such issues from
the jury...." Trial Rule 50(A).
6. Trial Rule 59(A) (4).
7. Trial Rule 59(E).
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matter for a trial judge and that judgments on the evidence are much to
be preferred to new trials.'
TRIAL RULE 52
Trial Rule 52 governs the decision of cases tried without juries. Of
course, at the end of such a trial, the decision of the case. is the sole
responsibility of the trial judge. He is to exercise his own judgment with
or without the help of an advisory jury. Questions do arise, however,
regarding when a trial judge may change his mind.
In federal practice, motions for amended or additional findings under
Federal Rule 52(b) serve primarily to permit the clarification of a court's
findings in order to provide a sounder and more revealing record for
appellate review.9 There is some dispute as to whether Federal Rule
52(b) may also be used for purposes analogous to rehearings; if a trial
judge thinks he has made a mistake, however, there seems to be no
reason why he should not be permitted to correct his findings."0 In any
case under the Federal Rules, it is in his discretion, within the time
provided, whether to take corrective action. Trial Rule 52 may have
restricted this power. Subdivision (B) of Trial Rule 52 specifies that
findings and judgments may be amended in four specified circumstances.
The stated grounds are all ones which would be appropriate for granting
a new trial, and the grammar of the rule suggests that these are the only
four grounds upon which amended findings and judgments may be
granted.'1 In spite of the drafting, it is unlikely that the enumeration of
these four conditions was intended to be a limitation. Indiana Supreme
Court Rule 1-8, which previously governed, did not contain the re-
strictive language, and the Reporter's Comments to the Proposed Draft
8. See notes 19-26 infra and accompanying text.
9. C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 429 (1970).
10. See, Nordbye, Comments on Selected Provisions of the New Minnesota
Rules, 36 MINw. L. Rxv. 672, 690-92 (1952).
11. Trial Rule 52(B) ;
Amendment of Findings and Judgment-Causes Therefor. Upon its own
motion at any time before a motion to correct errors (Rule 59) is required
to be made, or with or as part of a motion to correct errors by any party,
the court, in the case of a claim tried without a jury or with an advisory jury,
may open the judgment, if one has been entered, take additional testimony,
amend or make new findings of fact and enter a new judgment or any com-
bination thereof if: (1) the judgment or findings are either against the weight
of the evidence, or are not supported by or contrary to the evidence; (2)
special findings of fact required by this rule are lacking, incomplete, in-
adequate in form or content or do not cover the issues raised by the pleadings
or evidence; (3) special findings of fact required by this rule are inconsistent
with each other; or (4) the judgment is inconsistent with the special findings
of fact required by this rule...."
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make no explanation. 2 The circumstances were probably specified to
avoid technical objections regarding whether these matters may be raised
on Rule 52 motions rather than solely in motions to correct errors, a kind
of technicality which has been all too frequent in Indiana practice and
which the new rules have tried in various ways to avoid.'
Indiana practice has been in the past, and will continue to be under
Trial Rule 52, distinct from federal practice in two other matters. The
Federal Rules require a trial judge to state findings of fact and conclusions
of law in all cases which he tried on the facts without a jury."4 Except in
three specified circumstances, Indiana is continuing its rule that specific
findings will not be required unless a party has made a written request
for them prior to the admission of evidence.'" This limitation is unduly
embarrassing to attorneys. It may be those judges who would be most
hostile to such requests from counsel from whom findings should most
surely be required.
The remaining distinction between the federal and Indiana rules 52
meriting comment is the omission in the new Indiana rule of an explicit
requirement that the judge state conclusions "of law," the language of
the new rule being that, where required, the court "shall find the facts
specially and state its conclusions thereon."1 The purpose of requiring
stated conclusions of law has been to allow an appellate court to determine
whether the trial judge has been asking the right legal questions of the
evidence.'" I do not think that the change in language in the Indiana
rule is dramatic enough to inhibit the appellate courts from administering
Trial Rule 52 for this purpose.
TRIAL RULE 59
Trial Rule 59 governs what is now to be termed the "Motion to
Correct Errors." The name is worth quibbling about briefly. It is true
12. Proposed Draft at 194-95.
13. The appellate courts will have considerable latitude in deciding how strictly
they wish to enforce these limitations, taking into account the harmless error principle.
See Trial Rule 61.
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
15. Trial Rule 52(A). The exceptions are:
The court shall make special findings of fact without request: (1) in
granting or refusing preliminary injunctions; (2) in any review of actions
by an administrative agency; and (3) in any other case provided by these
rules or by statute. . . Findings of fact are unnecessary on decisions of
motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other motion except as provided in
Rule 41 (B) (dismissal) and 59(E) (motion to correct errors).
16. Trial Rule 52(A). The corresponding provision of FED. R. CIv. P. 52(a)
reads, "The court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of
law thereon. .. ."
17. See, Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 292-93 (1960).
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that "new trial" is not fully descriptive of the various things trial judges
can do under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules or in motions for new trials in
past Indiana procedure. On the other hand, granting a party a remedy
for accident, surprise or newly discovered evidence' cannot aptly be
described as correcting an error. More substantially, the use of the word
"error" calls to mind those things for which trial court judgments may be
reversed in appellate courts. Two questions are posed: Is there in new
Rule 59 a constriction of the trial court's privilege to grant new trials?
Second, is the power of the trial court to make definitive dispositions
increased at the expense of jury trial? The answer to these questions, in
general, is "no," but the answer is not in all respects easy.
A correct and reasonable reading of Trial Rule 59(E) (7) carries
forward the traditional distinctions regarding when new trials are ap-
propriate as opposed to entering definitive judgments. The language in
Trial Rules 50(A), 59(A), and 59(E) (7) is not fully consistent and
parallel, which is unfortunate, but the intent regarding the treatment of
jury verdicts is adequately clear. 9 Somewhat more disturbing is the pro-
vision in the final paragraph of Trial Rule 59 (E) which states that when
a new trial is granted, the trial court shall specify its findings supporting
its ruling and that if the ground is that "the decision is found to be against
the weight of the evidence, the finding shall relate the supportinig and
opposing evidence to each issue upon which a new trial was granted."
This last requirement had been deleted from the rule by the legislature,2"
but was reinstated by the Supreme Court in its promulgation of the
Rules." It is striking that the trial judge is placed under a more stringent
requirement of findings in awarding new trials than he is when providing
for the definitive judgment in a case under Trial Rule 52.22 What is the
purpose of this new requirement, which is more burdensome regarding
new trials than that found in any other jurisdiction? Surely some trial
judges will now be more reluctant to award new trials on the ground
that a verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Is it also the intent
of the rules that appellate courts will now review more closely such trial
18. Trial Rule 59(A) (2), (6).
19. See notes 3-4 supra and accompanying text. The Reporter's Comments to
Proposed Draft, at 221, state,
[If a nonadvisory jury verdict is involved, the court must weigh the
evidence. If the preponderance of the evidence is found to favor a contrary
result, the trial court must order a new trial-the court cannot in this case
enter judgment in accordance with its views.
20. Acts 1969, ch. 191, § 1 Rule 59(E).
21. This is only one of several places where the Supreme Court has not followed
the Act of the General Assembly. Regarding the process of amending the rules, see
Trial Rule 80.
22. See, supra notes 14-15.
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court rulings? The Reporter's Comments to the Proposed Draft state
that the requirement of findings "will give the court upon review some
basis for determining whether or not the order was correct."2 This
articulation may assume a standard of review of orders granting new
trials at variance with federal and Indiana law. The Indiana cases have
consistently held that such rulings are reviewable only for abuse of
discretion,24 both before and after the enactment in 1959 of the statute
treating orders granting new trials as final judgments for purposes of
appeal. 5 It will be interesting to see under the new rule what becomes of
the principle stated by the Indiana Supreme Court as early as 1877, and
respected by our appellate courts since that time, that trial courts, having
heard the actual evidence and testimony, "must clearly [find] that
substantial justice has been done" by the verdict or else order a new trial.2"
Trial Rule 59(E) (5) provides that, "in the case of excessive or
inadequate damages" the court in appropriate cases may enter "final
judgment on the evidence for the amount of proper damages ... .""2 The
Reporter's Comments to the Proposed Draft stated that, "It is now
intended that the court is empowered to enter the final judgment fixing
proper damages when the evidence is clear and unrebutted after the jury
has committed error in assessing damages."2  It seems clear on close
reading that the rule merely implements the provisions of Trial Rule 50
for judgments on the evidence and is not an invitation to trial judges to
weigh conflicting evidence on damages in jury trails and enter definitive
judgments.
Provisions in Trial Rule 59 promoting the use of partial new
trials and allowing additur also raise questions regarding the displace-
ment of juries. As noted, Trial Rule 59(E) discourages new trials.
It states that the court shall correct error "without a new trial unless such
relief is shown to be impracticable or unfair to any of the parties or is
otherwise improper." It provides further that "if a new trial is required
it shall be limited only to those parties and issues affected by the error
unless such relief is shown to be impracticable or unfair."29 In addition
23. Proposed Draft at 221.
24. E.g., Stinson v. Mettert, 141 Ind. App. 354, 228 N.E.2d 43 (1967) ; Bailey v.
Kain, 135 Ind. App. 657, 192 N.E.2d 486 (en banc, 1963) ; Newsom v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Co., 134 Ind. App. 120, 186 N.F2d 699 (1962) ; Topper v. Dunn, 132 Ind. App. 306, 177
N.E.2d 382 (1961) (new trial granted prior to 1959 amendment) ; Christy v. Holmes,
57 Ind. 314 (1877).
25. Ind. Ann. Stat. § 2-3201 (Burns Repl. 1968) (Acts 1881 (Spec. Session),
ch. 38, § 628; amended, Acts 1959 (91st session), ch. 25 § 1).
26. Christy v. Holmes, 57 Ind. 314, 316 (1877).
27. (Emphasis supplied).
28. Proposed Draft at 219 (emphasis supplied).
29. The phrase "impracticable or unfair" presumably refers to the considerable
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to promoting partial new trials, the rules also provide for conditional new
trials, not only by remititur, but also by additur. ° In 1935 additur was
ruled unconstitutional in the federal courts,"' but the validity of that
decision has been often doubted. 2 Unfettered by prior explicit rulings,
the Indiana Supreme Court will probably permit additur, although they
should not feel bound by the fact that they have promulgated the rule. 3
The Comments to the Proposed Draft, however, fail to utter any caution
whatever regarding the danger of compromise verdicts. Whenever dam-
ages are substantially less than would be required under the evidence,
there is a suspicion of a jury compromise, and partial new trial and
additur should be granted in such cases only after giving consideration
to that possibility.
There are two other aspects of Trial Rule 59 which deserve com-
ment. Subdivison (B) of this rule may be the most welcome reform in
the entire set of rules." It brings Indiana practice much closer to the
federal and should overcome what has been a serious technical hurdle in
obtaining appellate review of errors fairly called to the attention of the
trial court. 3
The other matter of interest is the 60-day time limit for Motions to
Correct Error. 6 The Federal Rules allow ten days for motions for a new
trial.17 The Proposed Draft provided a 30-day period," and that may have
been too long. Now the rule, as promulgated, allows two months. I
realize that this lengthy period may be thought necessary because of Trial
Rule 59(G) making a Motion to Correct Error a condition to appeal, thus
making it desirable that a full opportunity to review the record of the
case be available within the time limit provided. 9 On the other side, it
should be noted that Trial Rule 62 provides for an automatic stay of
body of case law which has held that partial new trials are improper unless the issues
are clearly severable from each other. E.g., Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin
Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
30. Trial Rule 59(E) (5).
31. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1934).
32. See, F. JAMES, CIvuL PROCEDURE 323-25 (1965).
33. Cf. Sibbach v. Wilson and Co., 312 U.S. 17 (1940); Schlagenhauf v. Holder,
379 U.S. 104 (1964).
34. "Form of Motion. A motion to correct errors shall state the issues upon which
error is claimed, but the issues are not required to be stated under or in the language
of the reasons allowed by these rules, by statute or by other law. .. ." Trial Rule 59(B).
35. See Reporter's Comments, Proposed Draft at 219-20.
36. Trial Rule 59(C).
37. FE. R. Cirv. P. 59(b).
38. Proposed Draft, Rule 59(C).
39. In remarks to the Annual Conference of the Indiana University School of Law
Alumni Association, November 7, 1969, Judge Roger 0. DeBruler of the Indiana Supreme
Court noted that the same provisions govern the perfection of appeals in criminal
litigation, giving special emphasis to the need for adequate time to review the record.
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execution during this 60-day period. Beyond that, the trial judge is given
discretion to stay execution further if a Motion to Correct Error is made,
and many judges may grant such stays as a matter of course."' It can be
seen that a judgment debtor will have considerable opportunity to delay a
claimant from having the benefit of his judgment.
TRIAL RULE 60 (B)
The principal provisions of Trial Rule 60 governing relief from
judgments conform quite closely to the Federal Rules. There are three
departures from the fderal rule which should be noted. In Federal Rule
60(b) the second listed ground for relief from judgments is "newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered
in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." Indiana Trial Rule
60(B) (2) has modified this in a way which may give some trouble.
It states as a ground for relief, "any ground for a motion to correct
error, including without limitation newly discovered evidence, which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a motion
to correct error under Rule 59." Trial Rule 60(D) permits "relief as
provided under Rule 59. .. ." Most grounds for a motion to correct error,
it would be thought, should be raised promptly or lost.41 Of course, all
motions under Trial Rule 60(B) are required to be brought "within a
reasonable time" and 60(B) (2) states that the ground for a motion to
correct error must not have been discoverable "by due diligence" within
the proper time limit. Even if trial courts take a conservative view of
these limitations, however, there is nothing to prevent hopeful losers from
making their motions and taking their appeals if they are refused. Trial
Rule 60(B) (2), properly understood, adds no substance whatever to the
Federal Rule. Indeed, the thought of the Indiana provision might have been
more aptly stated in an inverted order as: Newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time for a
Motion to Correct Error under Rule 59, including evidence bearing on
any ground for a Motion to Correct Error. But if the rule drafter intended
no new substance, why did they modify the language.? This provision
will, no doubt, be sensibly administered; however, the thought of a judg-
ment displacing a jury verdict entered "on the evidence" up to one year
after a final judgment is very disturbing. Such an event is at least a
theoretical possibility under subdivisions (B) (2) and (D) of Trial
40. Trial Rule 62(B) (1).
41. It is difficult to see why grounds for motions to correct errors based on events
which occur during trials or which appear on the face of the record cannot be raised in
a motion to correct errors.
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Rule 60.
Another departure from the federal rule in Trial Rule 60(B) is the
inclusion of a specific ground for relief for defendants against whom
default judgments have been rendered in cases where service has been
by publication only and where the defendants were without actual
knowledge of the proceedings.42 The provision is a good one. There should
be no negative implications regarding availability of relief from default
judgments for "mistake, surprise or excusable neglect" under (B) (1),
but there may be an issue.
The other novelty of Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) is clause (5)
governing relief from judgments where an infant or incompetent may not
have been represented by a guardian or other legal representative in
certdin circumstances. I see two problems of construction. First, are there
negative implications to be read into the introductory phrase excepting
divorce decrees from the judgments to which this provision applies, and
does "divorce decree" refer only to status or does it also include decrees
for support? Secondly, what is the relation of 60(B) (5), the provision
in question, to 60(B) (6) and (8) providing relief where "the judgment
is void" and where there is "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation of the judgment." These are clauses which would have governed
this problem absent the inclusion of this novel provision.43 Further, does
this new provision by implication restrict the grounds which will be
available to attack a judgment in a separate action? There may be a
constitutional problem in protecting absolutely the party who had no
"notice" of the infancy or incompetency, thus prompting alternative re-
liance on the other clauses and on independent actions.
In conclusion, the new Indiana rules governing post-trial motions
promote a flexibility and practicality of administration which are very
desirable. The novelty of their structure and drafting, however, will
make it necessary to confront these provisions with great care.
42. Trial Rule 60(B) (4).
43. Judgments against minors are probably voidable, rather than void. The
absence of reported cases dealing with this problem under FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is
rather striking.
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